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Prejudice Made Plausible? Foreign criticism and Chinese 
sensitivity 
February 25, 2008 in Uncategorized by The China Beat | 25 comments 
Living in Beijing as I do, it’s not uncommon to be asked about my feelings on the Olympics. Chinese 
friends, family, colleagues, and even complete and total strangers (for reasons passing understanding) 
seem interested in hearing my opinion. 
But I’ve learned the hard way that my perspective per se is not what is actually being sought, but 
rather confirmation of what The People’s Daily and CCTV assure all Chinese is the only possible correct 
answer: Yes, the Olympics are going to be a huge success and will demonstrate to the world that 
China is becoming a modern, developed nation. Deviations from that line are not always received well 
and sometimes elicit outright hostility, which leaves me to wonder: Why is that? Why does concern 
about the Olympics, criticism of Chinese government policies, or even a news story about the effect of 
air pollution on athletes, provoke such a visceral response from many Chinese? 
Obviously no one set of reasons can cover the gamut of reactions, everybody perceives issues in 
different ways, but in perusing the comments section of China blogs and the threads on Chinese BBSs, 
I sense three main themes: the close integration of state/nation/party in both PRC ideology and the 
minds of the Chinese people; genuine pride at China’s rise in the world and a belief that many 
countries in “the West” seek to undermine China’s development to satisfy their own selfish strategic 
goals; and finally, a barely smoldering resentment born out of a history of foreign imperialism in 
China. 
In the United States, there is a tradition–fragile though it may be at times–that says criticism of 
government policies is not only a right, but in fact is the responsibility of a concerned citizen. Painting 
in the broadest possible strokes, the founding fathers established a system whereby the state and the 
nation were separate entities, one under the supervision of the other. This separation means that one 
can accuse the government of wrongdoing without necessarily implicating the nation or its people. 
Sure, I might get annoyed a bit whenever non-American friends denounce the United States for the 
invasion of Iraq or whatever, but at the end of the day it doesn’t affect me all that much: I know it’s a 
policy of my government that’s being criticized, one which I also oppose, and generally speaking they 
aren’t attacking me personally or the American people as a whole. 
In China, on the other hand, the demands of 20th-century state building, first under the KMT and later 
by the CCP, fused the ideas of nation and state (and later nation, state, and party) into an inseparable 
ideology which was then disseminated through propaganda and education to the people.* To criticize 
one is to attack the whole. Political culture in the PRC has no place for a loyal opposition, never mind 
the dictum, tenuously attributed to Thomas Jefferson, linking dissent and patriotism. As a result, 
publicly questioning the government in China is a crime for which the perpetrator risks arrest as a 
‘threat to social stability and state security.’ Foreigners who do so are counterattacked as China-
bashers; those Chinese who speak out against their own government in the foreign press are pilloried 
on electronic bulletin boards as hanjian, traitors to their race, an epithet to which Chinese nationals 
working for foreign media organizations are also frequently subjected. 
Moreover, this response carries with it the implicit–and occasionally explicit–tag that those who 
criticize China are simply jealous and/or fearful of China’s rise. 
The Chinese are justifiably proud of how far their country has advanced in the last 25 years, and 
today’s China is a testament to the spirit of its people, who through their hard work and 
entrepreneurial drive have launched an era of unprecedented economic growth and development. At 
the same time, old ideas die hard. 
Social Darwinism was first introduced to China through the writings and translations of Yan Fu and 
Liang Qichao in the late-19th century, at a time when the rapacious demands of the imperialist powers 
threatened to carve up China (as the oft-quoted trope goes) like a melon. It is little wonder then that 
early 20th-century intellectuals and state builders looked out into the world and saw nothing but 
power politics and a global struggle for national survival. After the founding of the PRC, this concept of 
a Darwinian international order diffused throughout society as CCP propaganda stressed the need to 
strengthen the state so that China would never again be bullied by foreign powers. Early production 
campaigns called on the people to overtake Britain and catch up with the United States. Competition 
was the name of the game. The antagonism and paranoia of this Cold War propaganda reinforced 
lessons learned during a long 19th century, and many Chinese came to believe that the world was 
indeed out to “get China” and geopolitics was a zero-sum game. It’s a perception that lingers to this 
day. 
What is a bit unusual however is the assumption by many people here that all Americans think this 
way too: that every single person in the US is fixated and frightened by China’s rise, and it is this fear 
that drives the negative media reporting on China’s environment, food safety problems, human rights 
abuses, etc. Part of this reaction can be attributed to the “CCTV-effect.” In China, the media is a tool 
for political control, and many Chinese–especially those who have limited international experience–
have trouble believing that the foreign media could operate any differently. 
Adding to this, the Chinese media is fond of parroting government officials who label the United States 
as human rights hypocrites, citing the usual suspects (slavery, imperialism, policy toward indigenous 
peoples) as well as tossing out a few new ones (waterboarding, the invasion of Iraq). Whether one 
feels this is a valid defense or not, the salient point is that many in China accept the government line 
as unequivocal proof that foreign critics cannot be trusted. 
Now, I can’t speak for everybody, but in conversations in Beijing with foreign journalists, activists, 
bloggers, researchers, businesspeople and teachers, the general consensus is that few, if any, have a 
problem with China’s development or truly fear China’s rise, certainly not in the way that nationalist 
rags like The Global Times would suggest. Generally speaking, we believe that criticism of the 
government is based on the notion that certain reforms would make the lives of the Chinese people 
more secure, prosperous, and free. Surely this is not “bashing China,” rather it’s expressing 
enthusiasm for our hosts’ good fortune and concern for our friends, the Chinese people. Right? 
Wrong, apparently. For you see, China has a long history of foreign do-gooders stepping on her soil 
and offering suggestions. (Who could forget Columbia professor Frank Goodnow’s helpful hint to Yuan 
Shikai in 1915 that what the Republic needed most was an emperor?) Missionaries, traders, 
academics, officials, and writers came to China in droves during the age of imperialism, all with ideas 
on how to fix China and make the lives of the Chinese better. The problem was of course that no 
matter how well-intentioned a notion, no matter how sound or rational it might have been, any idea 
becomes a hard fit when it arrives shoehorned between military occupations and adventures in 
gunboat diplomacy. 
This left its mark on how foreign ideas were perceived and deployed in Chinese society. The challenge 
in the early-2oth century to reconcile Chinese tradition and foreign ideas has been a recurring theme 
in the literature on modern Chinese intellectual history. That struggle to define modernity, to 
understand how to be both fully modern and fully Chinese, and how to achieve a sense of equivalency 
with the West, was left unresolved at the time of the CCP takeover in 1949. Marxism purported to be 
the answer to this dilemma, but as Marxism loses its intellectual currency in today’s China A-Go-Go, 
old questions and nagging insecurities start to reemerge. 
At the same time, the legacies of imperialism are reinforced in many ways, not the least of which is 
through the ‘patriotic education’ that’s a key part of the elementary and secondary curriculum in the 
PRC. Nobody needs to be reminded of the intimate link in China between history, politics, and 
education. The CCP itself never stops telling the people that it was the Party who was responsible for 
driving out the foreign imperialists and ending the ‘century of humiliation’ that began with the Opium 
War in 1840. As such, the story of imperalism is not only an important aspect of China’s recent 
history, but also a fundamental building block of the CCP’s political legitimacy. 
Given that historical context, the politics of education, and the effectiveness of CCP propaganda, it is 
easy to understand why many Chinese have a hard time believing that foreigners who criticize the 
Chinese government might actually be doing so in the interests of the Chinese people. At best, it’s 
seen as a kind of misguided paternalism, at worst, a wolf-in-sheep’s-clothing attack on Chinese 
sovereignty. The issue becomes murkier still when the issue is “Chineseness” itself, as in the case of 
Tibet, Taiwan, and Xinjiang. 
The notion of ‘face’ obviously deserves to be a part of this discussion, but at the same time it’s a bit of 
an intellectual cul-de-sac. It’s not that I consider face to be unimportant, but I do feel non-Chinese are 
too quick to dismiss an inability to handle criticism as some sort of inherent quirk of Chinese culture. 
Nobody would deny that ‘face’ is a crucial factor in business, diplomacy, and even daily life here, but 
there is more to the Chinese response beyond the somewhat simplistic and essentialist explanation of 
‘saving face.’ 
China’s development has been something to behold, but there are challenges still unresolved: 
staggering environmental problems, a widening gap between the haves and have-nots, and endemic 
corruption that flourishes in a political culture where the media is censored, non-governmental 
organizations are proscribed, public speech is still tightly controlled, and where the priority of judges 
and the courts is maintaining ‘harmony’ at the expense of petitioners’ requests to avail themselves of 
their legal rights. The CCP and the Chinese government have done a thorough job of spreading a 
message that is equal parts Lenin, Louis XIV, and Ronald Reagan: The party represents the people 
because apres mois, le delugeand, by the way, it’s morning again in China and you are better off now 
than you were four years ago. It’s an interesting mash-up of political philosophies, but one that has to 
a large extent become internalized by the Chinese people, especially the urban elite who have 
benefited the most from the recent economic boom. Regardless of class however, the idea that the 
nation’s interests exist independent of the state and party is, for most people, inconceivable. 
Foreigners should be allowed to criticize the Chinese government when such criticism is warranted, 
and I don’t waive my right to speak out against injustice just because I wasn’t born in the country 
where that injustice is occurring. But at the same time, I shouldn’t be surprised when my criticism 
sometimes meets resistance and resentment. Sincere engagement with the Chinese people can only 
come about when the roots of that resistance are acknowledged, and met with equivalent 
understanding and sensitivity. In this way a true dialogue can begin with people talking to–rather than 
at–each other. 
————- 
* For further reading and a more in-depth treatment of this issue, see John Fitzgerald,Awakening China: Politics, 
Culture, and Class in Nationalist China. (Stanford Univ. Press, 1998) 
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